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Abstract
We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the
maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system’s equilibrium. The motiva-
tion for this approach is a well known paradox in multimarket Cournot competition, where a
positive price shock on a monopoly market may actually reduce the monopolist’s profit. We
use our approach to quantify for the first time the worst case profit reduction for multimarket
oligopolies exposed to arbitrary positive price shocks. For markets with affine price functions
and firms with convex cost technologies, we show that the relative profit loss of any firm is
at most 25% no matter how many firms compete in the oligopoly. We further investigate the
impact of positive price shocks on total profit of all firms as well as on social welfare. We find
tight bounds also for these measures showing that total profit and social welfare decreases by
at most 25% and 16.6%, respectively. Finally, we show that in our model, mixed, correlated
and coarse correlated equilibria are essentially unique, thus, all our bounds apply to these
game solutions as well.
JEL: C72, D43, L13
1 Introduction
Many economic settings can be modeled as strategic games (N,X, u), where N denotes a set
of players, X is the set of possible states of the games (all possible decisions by all players)
and u : X → RN denotes the players’ payoff functions, i.e. in state x ∈ X player i receives
payoff ui(x). Given an instance of such a model, there are parameters that determine the
precise values for N , X, and u. Comparative statics is concerned with the effect of changes
in these parameters on the equilibria of the game. Examples of such changing parameters are
exposure to international trade (Krugman [35], Melitz [38]) or a forced reduction of produced
quantity (Gaudet and Salant [22]) (both affect the state space) or changes of the payoff functions
via a demand shift (Quirmbach [52]), a cost shift (Fe´vrier and Linnemer [21]), or the introduction
of export taxes/subsidies (Brander and Spencer [5], Eaton and Grossman [16]). A classical
approach to comparative statics analysis uses the implicit function theorem1(cf. Bulow et al.
[6]). This type of analysis, however, is restricted to small (local) parameter changes, and,
thus, does not allow for meaningful conclusions if parameter changes happens to be discrete.
Moreover, it requires knowledge of the precise instantiation of the model (in contrast to knowing
only some functional forms of the models, e.g., utility functions are concave). A more recent
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1The application of the implicit function theorem for instance in oligopoly models requires some regularity
assumptions such as convexity and smoothness of cost and inverse demand functions, see the discussion in Milgrom
and Roberts [40].
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approach to comparative statics is based on the powerful machinery of lattice theory applicable
to supermodular games, see Amir [2], Edlin and Shannon [17], Milgrom and Shannon [41],
Milgrom and Roberts [39, 40], Shannon [60] and Topkis [61, 62], also Athey [4], Quah [51], and
Vives [68, 69]. Common to all these works is that they consider the monotonicity of effects, i.e.,
whether a certain objective function increases or decreases with a parameter, but they do not
quantify the effect.
Our approach is to capture the maximum possible effect that the change of a parameter –
shift of the inverse demand function in our case – can have. This worst-case approach exhibits
both
1. significance: are changes in a given parameter worth considering?
2. robustness: how sensitive is the game to changes of a parameter?
Significance is a crucial motivation of both the analysis of an effect and discussion of whether
it can be put to use (a` la ‘should a new tax be introduced?’). Robustness on the other hand
is important when there is uncertainty about the values of parameters and when parameters
change over time.
A Paradox in Multimarket Cournot Oligopolies. We apply our approach to the multi-
market oligopoly model introduced by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer [6]. They investi-
gated how “changes in one market have ramifications in a second market” and discovered that a
positive price shock in a firm’s monopoly market can have a negative effect on the firm’s profit
by influencing competitors’ strategies in a different market. This counterintuitive phenomenon
led them to the classification of markets in terms of strategic substitutes and strategic com-
plements.23 Our paper is about rigorously quantifying profit effects induced by price shocks in
multimarket Cournot oligopolies.
Let us recall the example of two markets {1, 2} and two firms {a, b} given in Bulow et al. [6].
Firm a is a monopolist on market 1 and competes with firm b on market 2. Demand is infinitely
elastic on market 1 for the constant price p1 = 50. On market 2, there is an affine price function
given by p2(qa,2 + qb,2) = 200− (qa,2 + qb,2), where qa,2, qb,2 denote the quantities offered by the
respective firms on market 2. Production costs are symmetric and given by c(q) = 1/2q2, where
q is the total quantity produced by a firm.4 In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain qa,1 = 0 and
qa,2 = qb,2 = 50 and each firm earns profits 3750.
Suppose now that market 1 experiences a positive price shock raising its constant price by
five units to 55. The Cournot equilibrium changes to qa,1 = 8 and qa,2 = 47, qb,2 = 51. Under
this new equilibrium, firm b increases its profit to 3901.5 while firm 1 obtains after the price
shock a profit of 3721.5. As noted by Bulow et al., the ”positive” price shock to market 1 has
hurt a even though a sells more units than before and receives on its monopoly market even at
a higher price. The actual profit reduction for firm a amounts to 0.76%. A natural question to
ask is: how much can a firm lose from a positive price shock on its monopoly market?
Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics. To address the above question, we propose
a robust quantitative approach to comparative statics. We aim at quantifying the maximum
possible effect that the change of a parameter can have on a given set of games.
2See Section VII in Bulow et al. [6].
3In a market with strategic substitutes, more aggressive play by a firm leads to less aggressive play of the
competitors on that market; with strategic complements, more aggressive play results in more aggressive play of
the competitors.
4Bulow et al. [6] assume additional fixed cost F > 0 to prevent firms from setting up multiple plants. Fixed
costs, however, do not change the resulting equilibria assuming that the access to markets is exogenously deter-
mined.
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Following the framework of Milgrom and Roberts [40], we denote by G a class of models or
games describing the information set of what the modeler knows about the economic environ-
ment. Suppose there is an objective function f : G → R (e.g., welfare of the unique equilibrium
outcome) to evaluate these games and denote for any G ∈ G by ∆G all parameter changes that
are to be considered. We express the effect of a parameter change δ ∈ ∆G on a game G ∈ G
(assuming for the moment f(G) 6= 0) as the value
γf (G, δ) =
f(G(δ))
f(G)
,
where G(δ) ∈ G denotes the changed game. For f(G) = 0, we set γf (G, δ) = 1, if f(G(δ)) ≥ 0,
and γf (G, δ) = −∞, if f(G(δ)) < 0. The maximum possible effect across all games in G and
their respective parameter changes ∆G is then defined as
γf (G,∆G) = inf
G∈G
inf
δ∈∆G
γf (G, δ).
Note that if we are interested in the opposite direction of f we can replace the infima with
suprema in the above definition.
Quantifying γf (G,∆G) can expose the significance and robustness of the effect of parameter
changes, contrasting comparative statics analysis that only reveals the monotonicity, as outlined
above. Besides a quantitative instead of a qualitative result, there are further key differences to
prevailing comparative statics approaches:
In practice, the economic model including the endogenous variables and parameters may not
be known precisely but only approximately by knowing some functional property of the relations
of endogenous variables or the space of parameters.5 The nature of a worst-case analysis such as
the proposed robust quantitative comparative statics is that it provides results across a class of
games G described for example by functional properties (e.g. any convex cost technologies in our
case) and a set ∆G of parameter changes. Both G and ∆G need to be chosen reasonably to yield
a meaningful result (any combination of positive price shocks in our case). This is contrasted
by the assumption of perfect knowledge of all elements of the precise instance G including the
precise parameter change δ common to most existing approaches in comparative statics, e.g.
those based on the implicit function theorem.
Our Results. We conduct robust quantitative comparative statics analysis for multimarket
oligopolies with affine price functions and convex cost technologies of firms, a class of games
that contains the above example. We consider positive price shocks as parameter changes and
three different objective functions: the individual profit of a firm, total profit measured by
summing up the firm’s profits, and social welfare defined by integrating the price functions and
subtracting the firm’s costs. We find that both profit and total profit can be reduced at most
25% by a positive price shock. For profit we give the bound as a function of the number of
firms, showing e.g. that in the two firm case the profit reduction is a most 6.25%. Social welfare
on the other hand can only be reduced by up to 16.7% by a positive price shock. These results
immediately extend to negative price shocks, as any negative price shock can be seen as taking
back a positive price shock. The profit and welfare gain from a negative price shock is no more
than 33.4%, and the social welfare can increase by up to 20%. Our results give the first robust
quantitative comparative statics result of an important paradoxical phenomenon previously only
qualitatively analyzed. We further show that for the considered model, mixed, correlated and
coarse correlated equilibria are essentially unique, thus, all these worst-case bounds apply to
these solution concepts as well.
5Milgrom and Roberts [40] refer to the set of possible instantiations of the model as a class of models, or the
context “representing what the modeler knows about the economic environment”.
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Each of our upper bounds is complemented by an instance that actually attains the worst
case ratio. We demonstrate that worst case instances are quite generic in the sense that only
a set of rather non-restrictive properties needs to be satisfied. Thus, a common criticism of
worst case analysis that isolated special cases lead to unrealistic objective function values does
not apply to our setting. If linearity of price functions (or convexity of cost functions) are
relaxed, our bounds do not hold anymore. For concave price functions (assuming still convex
cost functions), we give an example in which the profit of a firm is eliminated after a positive
price shock. For non-convex cost functions we sketch a similar example.
Example Application. Profit gains from negative price shocks can occur in international
trade, as noted by Bulow et al. [6, Sec. VI (C)]. Consider two markets located in separate
countries with convex cost technologies, one of which is a monopoly market for firm a. A
tax change in the country of the monopolist can be considered a price shock. A government
may decide to increase domestic taxes in order to increase firm a’s profitability in the foreign
market. Our results imply that this positive effect can indeed be significant as it may increase
the profitability by up to 33% of current profits.
2 Related Literature
Comparative statics has long been used to understand how a system is affected by changes of
underlying parameters, see Dixit [15] for an overview.
Since Bulow et al. [6] introduced the concepts of strategic substitutes and strategic comple-
ments, a considerable amount of research has used comparative statics to investigate situations
where strategic substitutes or complements occur. Notably, Brander and Spencer [5] found
that an export subsidy can increase welfare in Cournot competition with strategic substitutes
(although they do not name the concept). Eaton and Grossman [16] extended this model to
a two-stage game where first governments set policies and then firms engage in competition.
Gaudet and Salant [22] looked at how a forced marginal change of production quantity for a
subset of firms impacts profit in a situation with strategic substitutes. Fe´vrier and Linnemer
[21] gave a decomposition of price shocks in Cournot oligopoly into an average effect common
to all firms and a heterogeneity effect that is firm-specific. Acemoglu and Jensen [1] present a
framework for comparative statics results for a superclass of Cournot oligopoly called aggregative
games, see also Corcho´n [8] and Kukushkin [36].
Worst case perspectives have a long tradition in the analysis of performance guarantees of
algorithms (cf. Williamson and Shmoys [70]). With the introduction of concepts like the “price
of anarchy” (cf. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [34]) they have found their way into economics
and game theory (a good overview on the intersection of computer science and economics is
given in the textbook Nisan et al. [49]). By now, there is a large body of literature quantifying
the worst case efficiency loss of equilibria (cf. Roughgarden and Tardos [59], Johari and Tsitsiklis
[29], Correa et al. [9]) and, in particular, in models related to Cournot competition (cf. Anderson
and Renault [3], Farahat and Perakis [19, 20], Guo and Yang [25], Johari and Tsitsiklis [30],
Kluberg and Perakis [32], Tsitsiklis and Xu [64, 63]). All these works follow the “price of
anarchy” methodology, where some performance measure of an equilibrium outcome (e.g., total
profit and/or social welfare) is compared with a corresponding optimal solution maximizing the
respective performance measure. There is a conceptual difference of our approach compared to
these previous worst case approaches: while in approximation algorithms and price of anarchy
one compares an optimum to a solution that is returned by an algorithm or that is an equilibrium,
we maintain an equilibrium concept and compare the equilibrium of an instance with that of a
perturbed instance. Of course, in our setting, a bound on the price of anarchy (with respect to
a specific welfare function) translates to a bound on the worst-case effect of a parameter change
as long as the optimal welfare increases with the parameter change (which is true in our case).
4
However, the price of anarchy in cournot oligopolies, e.g., for total welfare (involving affine price
functions and convex costs) is known to be 4/(3 +n), where n is the number of firms (cf. Harks
and Miller [27], Moulin [43]). Also for social welfare the known bound of 2/3 (cf. Johari and
Tsitsiklis [30]) does not give tight bounds for our setting. In the context of multimarket Cournot
oligopoly, to the best of our knowledge, we derive for the first time a worst case quantification
of a parameter change previously only qualitatively described by comparative statics.
There are works in theoretical computer science and mathematics that quantify the effects
of a parameter change, albeit for different settings. Prominent examples include the analysis
of the famous Braess paradox, where a limit on the decrease in a network’s performance when
additional links are added is shown (cf. Korilis et al. [33], Lin et al. [37], Roughgarden [56], Valiant
and Roughgarden [67]).
3 Multimarket Cournot Oligopoly Model
In this section we introduce the specific model for which we investigate robust quantitative
comparative statics. As outlined above, the three ingredients for such analysis are a set of
games G, for each such game G ∈ G a set of feasible parameter changes ∆G and an objective
function f : G → R to evaluate the games.
Class of games G. We consider multimarket oligopolies defined as follows: In a game G ∈ G
a set N of n firms competes in a set of markets M . Each firm i ∈ N has access to some subset
Mi ⊆M of these markets. A strategy of a firm i is to choose nonnegative production quantities
qi,m for all markets m ∈Mi that it serves. We set qi,m = 0 for any market not served by firm i
and denote the total quantity of firm i by qi =
∑
m∈M qi,m. Correspondingly, the total quantity
on any market m is denoted by qm =
∑
i∈N qi,m.
Assumption 1. The price of a market is an affine function of the total quantity produced, i.e.,
if on market m ∈M a quantity qm is produced, the price is pm(qm) = sm− rmqm, where sm > 0
is an initial positive price and the coefficient rm > 0 describes how the price decreases as the
total quantity is increased.
We sometimes denote the price function on a market simply by pm(q).
Assumption 2. Firm i’s cost for producing the quantity qi is given by the function ci(qi) which
we assume to be nondecreasing, convex and differentiable in qi with ci(0) = 0.
Given production quantities for all firms, the utility of firm i is defined as
ui(q) :=
∑
m∈M
pm(qm)qi,m − ci(qi).
In a Cournot equilibrium, firms choose their quantities so as to maximize their utility. Partic-
ularly, in a Cournot equilibrium q no firm can increase its utility by unilaterally deviating to a
different strategy, i.e., ui(q) ≥ ui(q
′
i, q−i) for all strategies q
′
i available to firm i. As the games
introduced above involve convex and compact strategy spaces together with quasi-concave util-
ities, standard fixed-point arguments of type Kakutani (cf. [14, 18, 24, 31]) imply the existence
of an equilibrium. Note that compactness of the strategy space can be guaranteed, because for
every firm and every market there exists a maximum quantity at which the market price goes
down to zero eliminating the firm’s profit. Thus, one can effectively bound all quantities by a
finite value. As shown in Section 4, the assumptions on the price and cost functions further
imply that there is a unique equilibrium.
We denote the marginal revenue of firm i on market m by
pii,m(qi,m, q−i,m) =
∂ (pm(qi,m + q−i,m)qi,m)
∂qi,m
= pm(qm)− rmqi,m,
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where q−i,m is the quantity sold by firms j 6= i. The marginal cost is c
′
i(qi), and we will often
write pii,m(q) and c
′
i(q). In an equilibrium x, the marginal revenue of any served market m equals
the marginal cost: pii,m(x) = c
′
i(x) for all i ∈ N with xi,m > 0.
Parameter changes ∆G. The parameter changes analyzed are positive shocks to the price
functions: on every market m of a game G ∈ G the price increases by some amount δm ≥ 0 such
that pδm(qm) = pm(qm) + δm. We denote the set of feasible parameter changes as ∆G := R
|M |
≥0 ,
where |M | is the number of markets in G.
Objective functions f . The games in G have unique Cournot equilibria (as shown in Section
4 and Section 6), and our three objective functions are equilibrium firm profit, equilibrium total
profit and equilibrium social welfare. Given a game G and a price shock δ, we denote the unique
equilibrium of G by x and the unique equilibrium of G(δ) by y.
1. firm profit: the profit of an individual firm is ui(q) =
∑
m∈M pm(qm)qi,m − ci(qi) and we
minimize across the firms of a game to obtain an overall measure:
γu(G, δ) := min
i∈N
uδi (y)
ui(x)
.
2. total profit: we consider utilitarian welfare, i.e. the sum of the profits of all firms U(q) :=∑
i∈N ui(q), such that
γU (G, δ) :=
U δ(y)
U(x)
.
3. social welfare: this measure assumes that the price function of a market expresses the
marginal value that the buyers in the market have from additional quantity of the good.
We denote S(q) :=
∑
m∈M
∫ qm
0 pm(z)dz −
∑
i∈N ci(qi), such that
γS(G, δ) :=
Sδ(y)
S(x)
.
While the first measure has been analyzed by Bulow et al. [6], the second two measures have
been used among others by Anderson and Renault [3], Ushio [66] and Tsitsiklis and Xu [64]. For
each measure, we strive to provide a infimum bound across all multimarket Cournot games in G
and price shocks ∆G combined with concrete games that converge to this bound. The following
example instance exhibits the basic intuition for the quantitative analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
Example instance. Consider a game with two markets. Market 1 is served only by a
monopolist (denoted as firm a), while all firms compete in market 2. Given a positive price shock
on market 1, firm a will reduce its quantity on market 2 in favor of selling more on its more
profitable monopoly market, see Figure 1a. In effect, the competitors’ marginal revenue strictly
increases and leads to a new equilibrium in which these competitors increase their quantities,
see Figure 1b. Markets in which a less aggressive play of one firm leads to a more aggressive
play of competitors are called markets with strategic substitutes, see Bulow et al. [6]. The more
aggressive competition experienced by firm a in market 2 reduces its profit below the original
level, or said differently, after the price shock a part of firm a’s quantity on market 2 has been
substituted by the competitors, see Figure 1c.
Negative Price Shocks. While we restrict our analysis to positive price shocks, the results
immediately extend to negative price shocks. If for example a subsidy (i.e. a positive price
shock) causes the equilibrium to shift such that the firms’ profits decrease, then taking back
the subsidy (i.e. a negative price shock) will restore the old equilibrium and thus increase the
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firm’s profits. In this sense the two effects are dual: any negative price shock can be seen as
taking back a positive price shock, and the profit gain from the negative price shock is equal to
the profit loss from positive price shock. This is true for any objective function f and, denoting
negative price shocks to a game by ∆−G we have γ
f (G,∆−G ) = (γ
f (G,∆G))
−1.
4 Maximum Profit Loss of An Individual Firm
We use robust quantitative comparative statics to investigate the worst case profit loss of a firm
from a positive price shock as expressed by γu(G,∆G).
Theorem 4.1. Given a game G with n firms, no firm loses more than a (n−1)
2
4n2
fraction of its
profit from a price shock (δm)m∈M with δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈M ,
γu(G, δ) ≥ 1−
(n − 1)2
4n2
≥
3
4
.
This is our main result. It shows that no firm loses more than 25% of current profits. This
bound is robust in the sense that it holds for an entire class of games and parameters, that is, in
order to arrive at this bound the modeler only needs to know that price shocks are nonnegative,
inverse demand functions are affine, and cost technologies are convex.
To prove the statement, we first establish uniqueness of equilibria and that a price shock
δ ≥ 0 causes the price on every market to increase, and that in this favorable setting every firm
increases its total quantity. Using these insights into the effect of the price shock, for any given
firm i we can identify a market where this firm suffers the relatively strongest loss and use this
to bound
uδi (y)
ui(x)
. This proves the theorem, as γu(G, δ) is the minimum of this fraction across
all firms. The following lemma follows easily by the fact that our games are exact (concave)
potential games over a convex and compact strategy space, see Monderer and Shapley [42]. We
give here an alternative combinatorial proof and some of the ideas will be used later on.
Lemma 4.1 (Uniqueness of equilibria). Let x and y be equilibria of some game G. Then x = y.
Proof. As a first step of the proof, we show that on every market m, xm = ym. Let M
+ :=
{m ∈M : xm < ym} and assume for a contradiction that M
+ 6= ∅. Then, there is a firm i with∑
m∈M+ (yi,m − xi,m) > 0 and a market m ∈ M
+ with yi,m > xi,m ≥ 0. It follows from the
equilibrium definition that in y firm i’s marginal cost and marginal revenue on m are equal, i.e.,
c′i(yi) = pm(ym)− rmyi,m < pm(xm)− rmxi,m ≤ c
′
i(xi), (1)
where we used that pm(ym) < pm(xm) because m ∈M
+. From c′i(yi) < c
′
i(xi) it follows that
yi < xi. (2)
Also, for all markets m′ ∈M where yi,m′ < xi,m′ , it follows again from the equilibrium definition
that
pm′(ym′)− rm′yi,m′ ≤ c
′
i(yi) < c
′
i(xi) ≤ pm′(xm′)− rm′xi,m′ ,
and hence, pm′(ym′) < pm′(xm′), i.e. m
′ ∈M+. Then, we find a contradiction as
0 > yi − xi =
∑
m∈M
(yi,m − xi,m) >
∑
m∈M+
(yi,m − xi,m) > 0.
Here, we can limit the summation from all m ∈M to m ∈M+ because we found that m′ ∈M+
for all markets with yi,m′ < xi,m′ .
As the next step of the proof, we use xm = ym for all m ∈M to show xi,m = yi,m for all firms
i. For a contradiction, assume there are i ∈ N and m ∈M such that xi,m < yi,m. Then, we can
again apply (1) to obtain yi < xi and there must be some market m
′ ∈ M with yi,m′ < xi,m′ ,
which leads with the same reasoning to xi < yi, a contradiction. Altogether, x = y.
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Figure 1: Example instance with two markets
qa
pi
a,2 (q
a,2 , x
−
a )
p1
xa,2
xa,2 + xa,1
c′a(qa)
qi
pi
i,2 (q
i , x
−
i )
xi,2
c′i(qi)
(a) Initial equilibrium x: The price on market 1 is constant at p1 (thus also firm a’s marginal revenue). On
market 2 the price is decreasing, such that firm a sees marginal revenue pia,2(·, x−a), given its competitors’
equilibrium quantities x
−a. Firm a produces xa,2 on market 2 such that the marginal revenue there is
equal to the marginal revenue p1 on market 1. Its production on market 1 is such that the marginal
cost of the aggregate quantity xa,1 + xa,2 is equal to p1. The competitors i 6= a have marginal revenue
pii,2(·, x−i) on market 2. They choose their equilibrium quantity xi,2 at the intersection of marginal cost
and marginal revenue.
qa
p1
pi
a,2 (q
a,2 , x
−
a )
p1 + δ
c′a(qa)
← → qi
pi
i,2 (q
i , y
−
i )
xi,2 yi,2
c′i(qi)
(b) Price shock triggers strategic substitution: The shock leads firm a to shift production from market 2 to
market 1. This increases the marginal revenue of competitors on market 2, causing increased production
yi,2 > xi,2.
qa
pi
a,2 (q
a,2 , y
−
a )
p1 + δ
c′a(qa)
ya,2 + ya,1ya,2 qi
pi
i,2 (q
i , y
−
i )
yi,2
c′i(qi)
(c) Effect on firm a’s profit: This derogates firm a’s marginal revenue on market 2, causing it to further
withdraw from the market. The shaded area indicates the profit loss from the strategic substitution,
which is partially compensated by profit gain from the increased price on market 1.
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We now show that the prices on all markets increase after the positive price shock.
Lemma 4.2. Let x and y be equilibria of a game G before and after a price shock (δm)m∈M
with δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M . Then, on all markets m ∈ M the price in y is higher than in x,
that is, pδm(ym) ≥ pm(xm).
Proof. While in the proof of Lemma 4.1 we compared two equilibria of the same game, we
now compare the equilibria before and after the price shock. The analysis remains largely
unchanged: if we denote by M+ := {m ∈M : xm+
δm
rm
< ym} the set of markets where the price
decreases, then M+ 6= ∅ still implies that there is some firm i with
∑
m∈M+ (yi,m − xi,m) > 0
and yi < xi as in (2), leading to the same contradiction as before. It follows that M
+ = ∅, i.e.
pδm(ym) ≥ pm(xm) for all m ∈M .
Given increasing prices, all firms increase their quantity.
Lemma 4.3. Let x and y be equilibria of a game G before and after a price shock (δm)m∈M
with δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈M . Then, each firm i ∈ N produces more in y than in x, yi ≥ xi.
Proof. Assume there is i ∈ N with yi < xi. Then
piδi,m(y) ≤ c
′
i(yi) ≤ c
′
i(xi) = pii,m(x)
on every market m ∈M with xi,m > 0. With p
δ
m(ym) ≥ pm(xm) as found in the previous lemma,
it follows that yi,m ≥ xi,m on every market with xi,m > 0, a contradiction to yi < xi. Hence
xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ N .
We now show that whenever a firm sells more quantity on every market in the new equilib-
rium, then also the firm’s profit increases.
Lemma 4.4. Let x and y be equilibria of a game G before and after a price shock (δm)m∈M
with δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M . If for a firm i ∈ N it holds that yi,m ≥ xi,m for all m ∈ M , then
ui(x) ≤ u
δ
i (y).
Proof. Recall that for every market m with xi,m > 0 (or yi,m > 0), we have
pm(xm)− rmxi,m = c
′
i(xi)
pδm(ym)− rmyi,m = c
′
i(yi).
Thus, we get
uδi (y)− ui(x) =
∑
m∈M
pδm(ym)yi,m − pm(xm)xi,m − ci(yi) + ci(xi)
= c′i(yi)yi − c
′
i(xi)xi +
∑
m∈M
rm(y
2
i,m − x
2
i,m)− ci(yi) + ci(xi)
≥ c′i(yi)yi − c
′
i(xi)xi − ci(yi) + ci(xi), (3)
where we used in (3) that (by assumption) yi,m ≥ xi,m for all m ∈M . Finally,
c′i(yi)yi − c
′
i(xi)xi − ci(yi) + ci(xi) = c
′
i(yi)(yi − xi) + c
′
i(yi)xi − c
′
i(xi)xi − ci(yi) + ci(xi)
≥ c′i(yi)(yi − xi)− ci(yi) + ci(xi) ≥ 0,
where we use that yi ≥ xi and the assumption that ci is convex.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
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Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let G be a game with n firms. We show that for any given firm i,
the inequality
uδi (y)
ui(x)
≥ 1 − (n−1)
2
4n2 holds. The theorem follows because γ
u(G, δ) is the minimum
of this quantity across all firms.
We denote by M− := {m ∈ M : yi,m < xi,m} the set of markets where firm i decreases its
quantity after the price shock and similarly by M+ := M \M− the set where i increases its
quantity after the price shock. Note that by Lemma 4.4 we can assume that M− 6= ∅ since
otherwise we obtain already uδi (y) ≥ ui(x).
We assume that the markets are indexed such that market 1 is a solution to
argmin
m∈M−
(pδm(ym)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m − rmyi,m(xi,m − yi,m)
(pm(xm)− c′i(xi))xi,m
. (4)
Note that the denominator of the above fraction is always positive as any market m ∈M− has
a non-zero quantity xi,m > 0 and thus by the first order equilibrium condition also pm(xm) >
c′i(xi).
We find the following relations that will be helpful later on: The quantity added in markets
in M+ corresponds exactly to the quantity taken away from markets in M− and the additional
quantity yi − xi, i.e. ∑
m∈M+
yi,m − xi,m =
∑
m∈M−
xi,m − yi,m + yi − xi. (5)
Also, the price in markets m ∈M+ in y is related to the marginal cost, i.e.
pδm(ym) ≥ p
δ
m(ym)− rmyi,m = pi
δ
i,m(y) = c
′
i(yi) (6)
which in turn is related to the price on markets m ∈M−, i.e.
c′i(yi) ≥ pi
δ
i,m(y) = p
δ
m(ym)− rmyi,m. (7)
As the cost function is convex,
c′i(yi)(yi − xi) ≥ ci(yi)− ci(xi). (8)
We combine the above to a statement that relates the profit of quantity added to M+ to the
profit lost by reducing quantity in M−,
∑
m∈M+
pδm(ym)(yi,m − xi,m)
(6)
≥
∑
m∈M+
c′i(yi)(yi,m − xi,m)
(5)
≥
∑
m∈M−
c′i(yi)(xi,m − yi,m) + c
′
i(yi)(yi − xi)
(7),(8)
≥
∑
m∈M−
(pδm(ym)− rmyi,m)(xi,m − yi,m) + ci(yi)− ci(xi). (9)
We further assume that
uδi (y)
ui(x)
< 1, as we are interested in worst case instances and our
lower bounds show that such instances exist. Note that for a fraction with value less than 1,
subtracting the same amount from both numerator and denominator decreases the value of the
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fraction. We estimate
uδi (y)
ui(x)
=
∑
m∈M− p
δ
m(ym)yi,m +
∑
m∈M+ p
δ
m(ym)yi,m − ci(yi)∑
m∈M− pm(xm)xi,m +
∑
m∈M+ pm(xm)xi,m − ci(xi)
(9)
≥
∑
m∈M− p
δ
m(ym)xi,m − rmyi,m(xi,m − yi,m) +
∑
m∈M+ p
δ
m(ym)xi,m − ci(xi)∑
m∈M− pm(xm)xi,m +
∑
m∈M+ pm(xm)xi,m − ci(xi)
≥
∑
m∈M− (p
δ
m(ym)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m − rmyi,m(xi,m − yi,m) +
∑
m∈M+ (pm(xm)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m∑
m∈M− (pm(xm)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m +
∑
m∈M+ (pm(xm)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m
(10)
≥
∑
m∈M− (p
δ
m(ym)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m − rmyi,m(xi,m − yi,m)∑
m∈M− (pm(xm)− c
′
i(xi))xi,m
(11)
(4)
≥
(pδ1(y1)− c
′
i(xi))xi,1 − r1yi,1(xi,1 − yi,1)
(p1(x1)− c′i(xi))xi,1
. (12)
In (10) we use that the cost function is convex and hence −ci(xi) ≥
∑
m∈M −c
′
i(xi)xi,m and
in (11) that the price in a market with positive quantity is at least the marginal cost, i.e.
pm(xm) ≥ c
′
i(xi) for a market with xi,m > 0.
We now further examine the relation of pδ1(y1), p1(x1) and c
′
i(xi). For any firm j 6= i that
has increased its quantity on market 1, i.e. yj,1 > xj,1, we get
p1(x1)− r1xj,1 = pij,1(x) ≤ c
′
j(xj) ≤ c
′
j(yj) = pi
δ
j,1(y) = p
δ
1(y1)− r1yj,1,
that is,
r1(yj,1 − xj,1) ≤ p
δ
1(y1)− p1(x1). (13)
Then, considering
∑
j:yj,1>xj,1
(yj,1 − xj,1)+ yi,1−xi,1 ≥ y1−x1, we can rather precisely observe
how the price on market 1 changes with the price shock.
pδ1(y1) = p1(x1) + δ1 − r1(y1 − x1) ≥ p1(x1) + r1(xi,1 − yi,1)− r1
∑
j:yj,1>xj,1
(yj,1 − xj,1)
(13)
≥ p1(x1) + r1(xi,1 − yi,1)− (n− 1)(p
δ
1(y1)− p1(x1)),
as there are at most n− 1 firms with yj,1 > xj,1. This can be rearranged to
pδ1(y1) ≥ p1(x1) +
r1
n
(xi,1 − yi,1). (14)
Observe further that xi,1 > 0 because market 1 is in M
− and hence
p1(x1)− r1xi,1 = pii,1(x) = c
′
i(xi). (15)
We continue the proof from (12),
uδi (y)
ui(x)
(12)
≥
(pδ1(y1)− c
′
i(xi))xi,1 − r1yi,1(xi,1 − yi,1)
(p1(x1)− c′i(xi))xi,1
(14)
≥
(p1(x1)− c
′
i(xi))xi,1 +
r1
n
(xi,1 − yi,1)xi,1 − r1yi,1(xi,1 − yi,1)
(p1(x1)− c′i(xi))xi,1
= 1 +
r1(
1
n
xi,1 − yi,1)(xi,1 − yi,1)
(p1(x1)− c′i(xi))xi,1
(15)
= 1 +
( 1
n
xi,1 − yi,1)(xi,1 − yi,1)
x2i,1
≥ 1−
(n− 1)2
4n2
=
3
4
+
2n− 1
4n2
.
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4.1 Lower Bound
To show that the bound of the previous theorem is tight, we construct a simple instance with
matching profit loss.
Proposition 4.1. For any n, there is a game G with n firms where a positive price shock
decreases the profit of some firm a by a factor (n−1)
2
4n2
, that is,
γu(G, δ) = 1−
(n− 1)2
4n2
.
Proof. The instance has two markets M = {1, 2} and there are n firms. All firms serve market
2 while market 1 is only served by some firm a ∈ N . We fix the price on market 1 before the
price shock to 0, i.e. p1 = 0 and r1 = 0. On market 2 the price is p2(q2) = 2 − q2, where q2 is
the total quantity sold in market 2. The cost of firm a for any total quantity qa = qa,1+ qa,2 is 0
if qa ≤
2
n+1 ; for any larger quantity the cost is prohibitively high. Note that although we treat
the cost function of firm a as a (non-differentiable) step function, we can also use differentiable
and convex functions approximating this step function within any precision leading to the same
bound (up to the selected precision). For firms i 6= a, the cost is always 0.
The Cournot equilibrium x of this game can be found through convex optimization. In the
equilibrium, no quantity is sold on market 1 and on market 2, xa,2 = xi,2 =
2
n+1 . Firm a’s profit
is ua(x) = (2− n
2
n+1)
2
n+1 =
4
(n+1)2
.
A price shock that increases the price on market 1 to n−1
n2
leads firm a to shift to market 1.
In the new equilibrium y, ya,1 =
n−1
n(n+1) , ya,2 =
1
n
, and yi,2 =
2n−1
n2
. The profit of firm a is
ua(y) =
(
2−
1
n
− (n− 1)
2n − 1
n2
)
1
n
+
n− 1
n2
n− 1
n(n+ 1)
=
3n− 1
n2(n+ 1)
.
Then, the ratio of profit before and after the price shock is
γu(G, δ) =
ua(y)
ua(x)
=
(3n− 1)(n + 1)
4n2
= 1−
(n− 1)2
4n2
.
Remark 4.1. Note that this lower bound is quite generic in the sense that such an instance can
be constructed for any price function on market 2 and any linear cost function for competitors
i 6= a. In general, the profit loss of a firm can be large when it has a strongly convex cost
function, such that a positive price shock in one market causes it to decrease quantity in another
market, and when this is met by competitors with linear (or not “too convex”) cost functions.
4.2 Non-convex Cost
If we abandon Assumption 2, i.e. allow non-convex cost functions, we possibly lose uniqueness
of equilibria and we would have to redefine our objective function, e.g. involving equilibrium
selection.6 Moreover, one can easily construct examples where a positive price shock completely
eliminates the profit of firm a firm in all equilibria. If e.g. fixed costs are allowed, in the example
of Bulow et al. [6] one can set the fixed cost of the monopolist equal to their revenue after the
price shock using the fact that fixed costs do not change the equilibria of the game as long as
nonnegative profits are guaranteed. Similar examples are possible if we mix between economies
of scale and diseconomies of scale among firms’ cost technologies.
6Cournot equilibria continue to exist for non-convex costs if inverse demand functions satisfy rather mild
assumptions, see, e.g., Novshek [50] and Amir [2] and Roberts and Sonnenschein [53].
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4.3 Concave Inverse Demand Functions
Relaxing Assumption 1 toward concave prices reveals another counterintuitive phenomenon:
Very small price shocks may decrease the profit of a firm by an arbitrary amount. Consider the
class H ⊇ G of games that allows for concave inverse demand functions. We obtain the following
value for γu(H,∆H).
Proposition 4.2. For any k ≥ 4, there is a game with only two markets and concave price
functions such that the profit ratio of one of the firms before and after a positive price shock is
less than 2
k
. Thus, γu(H,∆H) = 0.
Proof. Fix some k ≥ 4. We construct a game G ∈ H to fulfill the above claim. The firm whose
profit ratio we observe, denoted by a, has cost ca(qa) = 0 for quantities qa ≤ 1 and prohibitively
high cost for larger quantities. All other firms i 6= a have cost ci(qi) = qi for any quantity.
Market 1 is only served by firm a and has constant price p1(q1) ≡ 0. Market 2 is served by all
firms and has a concave price function satisfying p2(1) = 1 with p
′
2(1) = −1 and p2(1+
1
k
) = 1− 2
k
with p′2(1 +
1
k
) = −k.
The initial equilibrium x of this game is xa,1 = 0, xa,2 = 1 and xj,2 = 0 for all j 6= a.
To verify this, observe that marginal revenue and cost of firm a are all equal as pia,1(x) = 0,
pia,2(x) = 1− 1 = 0 and c
′
a(x) = 0 as well as for competitors j 6= a we have pij,2(x) = 1 = c
′
j(x).
Let the price shock be δ1 =
1
k
and δ2 =
3
k
. The new equilibrium is ya,1 = 1 −
1
k
, ya,2 =
1
k
and yj,2 =
1
k2
for all competitors j 6= a. We again verify piδa,1(y) =
1
k
, piδa,2(y) = 1 +
1
k
− k 1
k
= 1
k
which are equal and greater than 0. For competitors j 6= a, piδj,2(y) = 1 +
1
k
− k 1
k2
= 1 = c′j(y).
We calculate the profit of firm a in both equilibria: ua(x) = 1 and thus
γ(G, δ) = uδa(y) = p
δ
1(y)ya,1 + p
δ
2(y)ya,2 − ca(y)
=
1
k
(1−
1
k
) + (1 +
1
k
)
1
k
=
2
k
.
5 Effect of Price Shocks on Aggregates
Theorem 4.1 shows that an individual firm can lose no more than 25% of its profit as a result
of a positive price shock. The lower bound, however, had the property that one firm loses but
all competitors gained in their total profits. In this section, we study effects of price shocks on
aggregate measures: the total profit and the social welfare.
5.1 Total Profit
Our first result showed that each firm may not lose more than 25% of current profits. By
the definition of γu(G, δ) it follows that the same holds true for total firm’s profits, that is,
γU (G, δ) ≥ γu(G, δ) ≥ 3/4 for any game G. More interestingly, we show an instance, where this
loss is actually attained, and, thus, γU (G, δ) = γu(G, δ).
Proposition 5.1. There is a game G ∈ G with n firms where a positive price shock δ decreases
the equilibrium total profit by a (n−1)
2
4(n2+n−1)
fraction of the original total profit, that is, by almost
25% for instances with many firms, that is
γU (G, δ) ≤ 1−
(n− 1)2
4(n2 + n− 1)
→n→∞
3
4
.
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Proof. The game is similar to that from that proof of Proposition 4.1, except that firm a can
produce a quantity of qa ≤ 1 at cost 0 and its competitors i 6= a have a per-unit cost of 1, i.e.
the cost is ci(qi) = qi.
The Cournot equilibrium x of this game can be found through convex optimization. In the
equilibrium, no quantity is sold on market 1 and on market 2, xa,2 = 1 and xi,2 = 0 for all i 6= a.
The equilibrium total profit is U(x) = 1.
A price shock that increases the price on market 1 to δ = n
2−1
2(n2+n−1)
leads firm a to shift to
market 1. In the new equilibrium y, ya,1 =
n2−n
2(n2+n−1)
, ya,2 =
n2+3n−2
2(n2+n−1)
, and yi,2 =
n−1
2(n2+n−1)
for
all i 6= a. The new equilibrium total profit is
U δ(y) = δya,1 + (2− (ya,2 +
∑
i 6=a
yi,2))(ya,2 +
∑
i 6=a
yi,2)−
∑
i 6=a
yi,2
=
3n2 + 6n− 5
4(n2 + n− 1)
.
5.2 Aggregate Social Welfare
We now consider the effect of price shocks on social welfare defined as
S(q) =
∑
m∈M
∫ qm
0
pm(z)dz −
∑
i∈N
ci(qi) =
∑
m∈M
(
smqm −
rmq
2
m
2
)
−
∑
i∈N
ci(qi). (16)
The first term in the above definition of S(q) measures the value that the buyers in the market
have of the goods while the second term simply sums up total production cost. Social welfare has
been considered before, among others, by Anderson and Renault [3], Ushio [66] and Tsitsiklis
and Xu [64]. For a given game G, we want to bound the ratio γS(G, δ) = S
δ(y)
S(x) .
Theorem 5.1. Given a game G, a positive price shock δ can decrease the social welfare by at
most a factor 16 , that is,
γS(G, δ) ≥
5
6
.
Before we prove the theorem, we characterize y with the following variational inequality.
Variational inequalities have been used before, e.g., in the context of characterizing equilibria
(cf. Dafermos [13], Haurie and Marcotte [28]) and for bounding the price of anarchy (cf. Correa
et al. [9], Cominetti et al. [7], Correa et al. [10], Harks and Miller [27], Harks [26], Roughgarden
[55], Roughgarden and Schoppmann [58]).
Lemma 5.1. Let y be the equilibrium for the game with price shock δm ≥ 0,m ∈ M and let x
be the original equilibrium. Then, for all i ∈ N it holds∑
m∈Mi
(
sm + δm − rmym − rmyi,m − c
′
i(yi)
)(
xi,m − yi,m
)
≤ 0. (17)
Proof. For every firm i, given the equilibrium quantities y−i of its competitors, the problem
max
qi,m≥0,m∈Mi
ui(qi, y−i)
is a convex program. Thus, at an optimal solution (yi,m)m∈Mi , the gradient∇ui(y) only decreases
along any feasible direction. In particular,
(
xi,m − yi,m
)
m∈Mi
is a feasible direction.
We now bound the welfare gained at x.
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Lemma 5.2.
S(x) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
3
2
rmx
2
i,m. (18)
Proof. Note that x is an equilibrium for the unperturbed game. In particular, the first order
necessary optimality conditions for each firm hold:
sm − rmxm − rmxi,m = c
′
i(xi) for all xi,m > 0. (19)
We combine this with the definition of the welfare (16),
S(x) =
∑
m∈M
(
smxm −
rmx
2
m
2
)
−
∑
i∈N
ci(xi)
≥
∑
m∈M
(
smxm −
rmx
2
m
2
)
−
∑
i∈N
c′i(xi)xi (20)
(19)
=
∑
m∈M
(
smxm −
rmx
2
m
2
− (smxm − rm(xm)
2 − rm
∑
i∈N
(xi,m)
2)
)
=
∑
m∈M
rmx
2
m
2
+
∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
rmx
2
i,m ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
3
2
rmx
2
i,m.
Here (20) follows by the convexity of ci and ci(0) = 0. Finally, x
2
m =
(∑
i∈N xi,m
)2
≥
∑
i∈N x
2
i,m.
We now prove the theorem.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 5.1. We establish the difference between Sδ(y) and S(x) through (16)
and the fact that ci(yi)− ci(xi) ≤ c
′
i(yi)(yi − xi) as the cost functions are convex and yi ≥ xi as
shown in Lemma 4.3.
S(x) = Sδ(y) +
∑
m∈M
(
smxm − (sm + δm)ym −
rm
2
(x2m − y
2
m)
)
+
∑
i∈N
(
ci(yi)− ci(xi)
)
≤ Sδ(y) +
∑
m∈M
(
(sm + δm)(xm − ym)−
rm
2
(x2m − y
2
m)
)
+
∑
i∈N
(
c′i(yi)(yi − xi)
)
.
Subtracting the variational inequality (17) summed up across all firms i ∈ N allows to simplify
the term.
S(x) ≤ Sδ(y) +
∑
m∈M
(
−
rm
2
(x2m + y
2
m) + rmymxm + rm
∑
i∈N
yi,m(xi,m − yi,m)
)
= Sδ(y) +
∑
m∈M
rm
(
−
1
2
(xm − ym)
2 +
∑
i∈N
yi,m(xi,m − yi,m)
)
≤ Sδ(y) +
∑
m∈M
rm
∑
i∈N
x2i,m
4
≤ Sδ(y) +
1
6
S(x). (21)
Here, we used for the first inequality in (21) that (xm−ym)
2 ≥ 0 and that yi,m(xi,m−yi,m) ≤
x2i,m
4 .
The final step applies the result of Lemma 5.2.
We can use the construction of Proposition 5.1 to obtain a matching lower bound.
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Proposition 5.2. There is a game G with many firms where a positive price shock decreases
the social welfare by 1/6 ≈ 16.6%, that is,
γS(G, δ)
n→∞
→
5
6
.
Proof. Note that S(q) = U(q)+ 12
∑
m∈M rmq
2
m. We use the instance and equilibria from Propo-
sition 5.1 and find S(x) = U(x) + 121
2 = 32 and
S(y) = U(y) +
1
2
(ya,2 +
∑
i 6=a
yi,2)
2 =
10n4 + 22n3 − 7n2 − 24n + 11
8(n2 + n− 1)2
n→∞
→ 5/4.
Combined, this approaches γS(G, δ)
n→∞
→ 54
2
3 =
5
6 .
6 Extension to Coarse Correlated Equilibria
In this section, we extend our results to a broader set of equilibrium concepts including mixed,
correlated and coarse correlated equilibria. It is well known that mixed equilibria are a subset of
correlated equilibria which itself are a subset of coarse correlated equilibria. We derive a struc-
tural result showing that for our model coarse correlated equilibria are essentially unique. While
for the class of strictly concave potential games (which includes our class of games), uniqueness
of correlated equilibria is already implied by the result of Neyman [48]7, our uniqueness result
extends to coarse correlated equilibria. It is worth noting that there exist strictly concave (even
quadratic) potential games that allow for multiple coarse correlated equilibria, see the recent
results by Moulin et al. [46, 47]. We first define coarse correlated equilibrium (cf. [45, 57]).
Definition 6.1 (Coarse correlated equilibrium). Given a strategic game (N,X, u), a probability
distribution σ : X → [0, 1] is a coarse correlated equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N ,
Ex∼σ [ui(x)] ≥ Ex∼σ [ui(yi, x−i)]
for all pure strategies yi ∈ Xi.
Theorem 6.1. For a (multimarket oligopoly) game G, let x be a random variable drawn from
the game’s strategy space and let x¯ = E [x] be its expected value. Then, the distribution of x is
a coarse correlated equilibrium if and only if x¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium, xm
a.s.
= x¯m on every
market m ∈M and ci(x¯i) = E [ci(xi)] for every firm i ∈ N . In that case also ui(x¯) = E [ui(x)],
U(x¯) = E [U(x)], and S(x¯) = E [S(x)].
We prove the theorem in four lemmata. We always denote by x a random variable drawn
from X with x¯ = E [x].
Lemma 6.1. If the distribution of x is a coarse correlated equilibrium, then x¯m
a.s.
= xm and,
thus, pm(x¯m)
a.s.
= pm(xm) on every market m ∈M .
7The uniqueness result of Neyman for correlated equilibria has later been generalized to general concave games
satisfying Rosen’s [54] sufficient condition for uniqueness, see Ui [65].
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Proof. For a coarse correlated equilibrium by definition,
E [ui(x)] ≥ E [ui(x¯i, x−i)]
= E

 ∑
m∈Mi
pm(x¯i,m + x−i,m)x¯i,m − ci(x¯i)


=
∑
m∈Mi
E [pm(x¯i,m + x−i,m)] x¯i,m − ci(x¯i)
=
∑
m∈Mi
pm(x¯m)x¯i,m − ci(x¯i) = ui(x¯) (22)
where (22) holds because the price functions are affine. Then, using that the cost is convex and
hence ci(x¯i) ≤ E [ci(xi)], ∑
m∈M
E [pm(xm)xm] =
∑
i∈N
E [ui(x) + ci(xi)]
≥
∑
i∈N
ui(x¯) + ci(x¯i)
=
∑
m∈M
pm(x¯m)x¯m. (23)
However, the markets’ price functions are affine, hence, pm(xm)xm is concave yielding
E [pm(xm)xm] ≤ pm(x¯m)x¯m. (24)
Combining (23) and (24) implies that the quantity (and thus also the price) on every market is
almost surely constant, that is, xm
a.s.
= x¯m.
Lemma 6.2. If the distribution of x is a coarse correlated equilibrium, then ci(x¯i) = E [ci(xi)]
for every firm i ∈ N .
Proof.
E [ui(x¯i, x−i)] =
∑
m∈Mi
E [pm(x¯i,m + x−i,m)] x¯i,m − ci(x¯i)
=
∑
m∈Mi
E [pm(xm)xi,m]− ci(x¯i) (25)
= E [ui(x)] + E [ci(xi)]− ci(x¯i),
where in (25) we use that pm(xm) is almost surely constant. As the distribution of x is a coarse
correlated equilibrium, i.e., E [ui(x¯i, x−i)] ≤ E [ui(x)], and the cost functions are convex, i.e.,
ci(x¯i) ≤ E [ci(xi)], we obtain ci(x¯i) = E [ci(xi)].
Note that from Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 it follows that if the distribution of x is a coarse
correlated equilibrium, ui(x¯) = E [ui(x)], U(x¯) = E [U(x)], and S(x¯) = E [S(x)].
Lemma 6.3. If the distribution of x is a coarse correlated equilibrium, then x¯ is a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Having shown that on every market pm(x¯m)
a.s.
= pm(xm) and for every firm ci(x¯i) =
E [ci(xi)], we find that
ui(x¯) =
∑
m∈Mi
pm(x¯m)x¯i,m − ci(x¯i)
=
∑
m∈Mi
E [pm(xm)xi,m]− E [ci(xi)]
= E [ui(x)] .
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For every alternative strategy yi ∈ Xi, the fact that the distribution of x is a coarse correlated
equilibrium gives
E [ui(x)] ≥ E [ui(yi, x−i)] ,
and because the price functions are affine we can use the linearity of expectation to find
E [ui(yi, x−i)] =
∑
m∈Mi
E [pm(yi,m + x−i,m)] yi,m − ci(yi) = ui(yi, x¯−i).
Combining the above, ui(x¯) ≥ ui(yi, x¯−i).
Lemma 6.4. Let x be distributed such that x¯ = E [x] is a pure Nash equilibrium and xm
a.s.
= x¯m
on every market m ∈ M and ci(x¯i) = E [ci(xi)] for every firm i ∈ N . Then, the distribution of
x is a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Proof. As above, E [ui(x)] = ui(x¯) and ui(yi, x¯−i) = E [ui(yi, x−i)] for all players i and strate-
gies yi ∈ Xi. Also, ui(x¯) ≤ ui(yi, x¯−i) because x¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consequently,
E [ui(x)] ≤ E [ui(yi, x−i)], that is, the distribution of x is a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Remark 6.1. For the special case of one market and two firms (duopoly), the uniqueness result
stated in Theorem 6.1 is implied by a result of Gerard-Varet and Moulin [23] where locally
improvable strategies via coarse correlation are characterized for a class of two-player games
that includes the case of one market, two firms, affine prices and convex costs. For general
n-player games, however, not much is known regarding sufficient conditions for uniqueness of
coarse correlated equilibria [44].
For our robust quantitative comparative statics analysis, we obtain that all our results carry
over to mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria.
Corollary 6.1. Given a game G and a price shock δm,m ∈M with δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M . It
holds that
1. γu(G, δ) ≥ 3/4
2. γU (G, δ) ≥ 3/4
3. γS(G, δ) ≥ 5/6,
even if in the definition of γt(G, δ), t ∈ {u,U, S} mixed, correlated or coarse correlated equilibria
are considered.
Remark 6.2. While our efficiency bounds are robust in the sense of Roughgarden [57] (trans-
lating to a broader set of equilibrium concepts), our bound in Theorem 4.1 is not derived based
on local smoothness arguments as used in [58]. In fact, in [58] examples are shown (in the con-
text of atomic splittable congestion games) in which coarse correlated equilibria perform strictly
worse than correlated equilibria.
7 Conclusions
Bulow et al. [6] showed that for multimarket oligopolies, a positive price shock can reduce a
monopolist’s profit. We directed a quantitative approach at their setting to provide an under-
standing of the significance and robustness of this effect. Our results – a positive price shock
can reduce a profit by 25% and a negative price shock can increase profit by 33% – imply that
the effect may be significant. For example, the possible 33% increase in profit may be enough
for a government to consider imposing a domestic sales tax in order to force domestic companies
to compete more aggressively abroad. For a market participant on the other hand, our results
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imply that equilibrium profit is robust in the sense that no more than 25% of current profit
is lost in case of a positive price shock. We further showed that social welfare is more robust
against positive price shocks: the worst case loss is bounded by 16,6%.
There are several natural extensions of our model:
- How does the bounds change assuming non-linear price functions or bounded price shocks?
- What can be said for more complicated market structures (nested in a graph) as considered
recently by Correa et al. [11, 12]?
- What can be said for general aggregative games with strategic substitutes as considered
by Acemoglu and Jensen [1]?
- Bulow et al. show qualitatively a similar paradoxical effect for markets with strategic
complements and joint economies of scale. Here, a quantification remains open.
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